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Bandits with adversarial scaling
Thodoris Lykouris∗ Vahab Mirrokni† Renato Paes Leme ‡
Abstract
We study adversarial scaling, a multi-armed bandit model where rewards have a stochastic
and an adversarial component. Our model captures display advertising where the click-through-
rate can be decomposed to a (fixed across time) arm-quality component and a non-stochastic
user-relevance component (fixed across arms). Despite the relative stochasticity of our model,
we demonstrate two settings where most bandit algorithms suffer. On the positive side, we show
that two algorithms, one from the action elimination and one from the mirror descent family are
adaptive enough to be robust to adversarial scaling. Our results shed light on the robustness of
adaptive parameter selection in stochastic bandits, which may be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
The multi-armed bandit setting is the cleanest paradigm to capture the tension between exploring
information about the underlying system and exploiting the most profitable actions based on the
current information. A decision-maker (or learner) repeatedly selects among a set of k actions
also referred to as arms, earns the reward of the selected arm, and obtains feedback only about it.
This creates a direct trade-off between learning about the performance of underexplored actions
and earning the reward from those that seem the most profitable. This trade-off is prominent in
applications such as display advertising where a platform needs to repeatedly select which ad to
show in response to a particular pageview. The arms therefore correspond to the competing ads
and, upon being shown, each ad can result in a click or not. We use this as a running example and
assume that the goal of the learner is to maximize the total number of clicks (in practice, there are
other goals such as revenue and user-experience, but we ignore those for simplicity).
Modeling this problem, one soon realizes that the two classical multi-armed bandit approaches fail
to capture the essence of the setting. The two main approaches in the multi-armed bandit learning
literature assume that the rewards obtained from each pageview are either completely adversarial or
coming from identical and independent distributions (i.i.d.). However, clearly some ads have better
quality and are consistently more clickable than others, so assuming a fully adversarial model seems
to ignore a lot of useful structure in the data. On the other extreme, stochastic models assume that
each ad has a fixed probability of being clicked whenever displayed (this is typically referred to as
click-through-rate). In practice, click-through-rates are known to vary due to various factors: time of
the day, day of the week, seasonalities (e.g. users tend to click more before Christmas and on Black
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Friday) but those factors affect ads uniformly. Tracà and Rudin [TR15] propose a model where the
mean µt(a) reward of an arm a at time t is a product
µt(a) = qt · θ(a)
of the intrinsic quality of the arm and a seasonality term qt. In the display ads example, qt is the
clickiness of the user behind her page-view and θ(a) is the intrinsic quality of the ad. The motivation
of [TR15] comes from retail: θ(a) is the effect certain action has in the store (the product price,
which items are on sale...) and qt is the number of customers in the store in that day. In their model,
the seasonality effect qt is known to the algorithm.
We depart from their model by assuming we do not have access to qt. In display ads, the clickiness of
users can be a function of a large number of covariates and it affects users in complex ways: certain
users click more during the evening while other users click more during the day. Clickness of users in
China is affected by Chinese New Year while clickiness of users in the US is affected by Thanksgiving.
Estimating all those patterns is costly so it is useful to have models that exploit the structure of
µt(a) without having to estimate the seasonality/clickness model directly.
To obtain more robust algorithms we assume qt is adversarially chosen and hence the name adversarial
scaling. If we think of qt as a seasonality effect, there is not an adversary per se in the motivation,
but rather a very complex pattern which we choose not to assume anything about to get robust
algorithms. However, qt can also model some actually adversarial effects. For example, an advertiser
may create a botnet that does not click anything in the initial time, i.e. qt = 0, aiming to prolong
the algorithm’s exploration and hence her number of displays. This attack is very simple to run
as it does not actively do anything and causes a cold start to the algorithm as the latter needs to
appropriately disregard these insignificant samples.
As we demonstrate in this paper, despite the inherent stochasticity in these settings (best arm is
better at each single round), we show that most stochastic algorithms perform poorly. This naturally
generates the following question:
What makes bandit algorithms robust to adversarial scaling attacks?
Our contribution. Tackling this question, we demonstrate that adaptive parameter selection is
essential for robustness to adversarial scaling. In particular, we show a modification of the classical
Action Elimination algorithm [EMM06] which we term AAEAS that uses the reward of the algorithm
as a proxy for the number of rounds that matter, i.e. the total scaling
∑
t q
t. This allows it to adapt
to the intrinsic qualities θ(a) without being misled by the adversarial scaling in a way similar to
the self-confident learning technique developed for small-loss bounds in adversarial bandits. The
resulting guarantees hold with high probability which is an advantage of this method.
Aiming to understand whether this robustness is satisfied more broadly, we then focus on the Online
Mirror Descent with Log-Barrier algorithm of Foster, Li, Lykouris, Sridharan, and Tardos [FLL+16].
Interestingly, when combined with the neat doubling trick of Wei and Luo [WL18], this algorithm
(then termed BROAD) seamlessly adapts to the total scaling. Its resulting guarantees hold only for
the weaker pseudo-regret notion but are stronger by a factor of k and the empirical performance is
also enhanced.
To complement our study, we show two very simple attacks manage to make, to the best of our
knowledge, all other stochastic algorithms perform ineffectively (detailed comparison in Section 4).
Surprisingly these attacks work even against the recent breakthrough, Online Mirror Descent with
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Tsallis entropy [ZS19]. The latter has optimal regret guarantee for both stochastic, adversarial
setting as well as regimes in between and is therefore considered as the best algorithm for such
intermediate settings.
The first attack is a purely stochastic setting where all the arms have fixed but really small means
µ(a) where µ(a?) is the mean of the best action. This can be viewed as adversarial scaling with
θ(a) = µ(a)µ(a?) and q
t = µ(a?). The bounds for these algorithms scales inversely to the absolute
difference µ(a?)− µ(a). In contrast, AAEAS and BROAD have boundes based on the normalized
difference 1 − µ(a)µ(a?) which provides great improvement when the means are small as typical in
click-through-rates for display advertising.
The second attack is a cold start attack where in some initial period, the qt = 0; this can arise
because either maliciously or organically as we discuss in the end of Section 4.2. The number of
rounds that have passed becomes a rather irrelevant quantity in this case as what really matters
is the
∑
t q
t. However, all algorithms other than AAEAS and BROAD use this number of rounds
(many of them in ways that seem not fixable). The cold start therefore leads them to a really bad
prior state and they take a very long time to recover. Surprisingly, the most effective stochastic
algorithm Thompson Sampling [AG17] is prone to this attack even when the cold start is really short
(see Figure 4).
Related work. Our paper lies in a broader line of work that tries to achieve enhanced guarantees
when data exhibit a particular benign structure. The main structure that has been utilized is the
data being i.i.d. across time where many algorithms achieve logarithmic guarantees at the existence
of a large gap in µ(a?)− µ(a). Under this structure, three previous lines of work study robustness
of bandit learning to adversarial components, orthogonal to adversarial scaling. We briefly discuss
them below and more elaborately review them in Section 4.
• Works on best of both worlds focus on the design of algorithms that achieve improved guarantees
when the input is stochastic while retaining the regret guarantees of adversarial algorithms
when this is not the case. This was introduced by Bubeck and Slivkins [BS12] and was further
studied in a sequence of works [SS14, AC16, SL17, WL18, ZS19, ZLW19]. Interestingly, our
work shows that the BROAD algorithm [WL18] is robust to adversarial scaling while Online
Mirror Descent with Tsallis entropy [ZS19] that is considered superior fails at the presence of
adversarial scaling. Our first algorithm can also be transformed to achieve such a best of both
worlds guarantee if combined with the techniques of [BS12].
• Works on bandits with adversarial corruptions allow an adversary to corrupt some rounds.
The adversary knows the distribution of the algorithm but not the randomness in the arm
selection (at the extreme, this can capture the adversarial bandit problem). The goal is to
a) achieve the improved guarantee when there is no corruption, b) have the performance
gracefully degrade with the amount of corruption, while c) being agnostic to the amount of
corruption. This was initially proposed by Lykouris, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme [LMPL18] who
provided regret high-probability guarantees based on a multi-layering extension of active arm
elimination. The guarantees were further improved by Gupta, Koren, and Talwar [GKT19]
while further improvements were achieved for the weaker pseudo-regret notion [ZS19]. Our
first algorithm can be made robust to adversarial corruptions if combined with the techniques
of [LMPL18] while the second algorithm is also robust to adversarial corruptions for the notion
of pseudo-regret.
• Last, a line of work aims to design attacks to stochastic algorithms when the adversary knows
3
the random arm selection of the algorithm at every round and not only the arm distribution
[JLMZ18, LS19]. These works aim to minimize the amount of manipulation in the rewards
needed for different objectives of the adversary and only provide attacks (instead of robust
algorithms). Our algorithms obtain linear regret against such attacks (the same happens with
all no-regret algorithms as these attacks give more power to the adversary than the adversarial
bandit model).
Beyond stochasticity, many works exploit other benign properties in the data to enhance adversarial
guarantees. Example properties include small variance of the losses [HK09, WL18], small effective
loss range [CBS18], small variation in the losses across rounds [BLLW19], small loss of the best arm
[AAGO06, Neu15, FLL+16, LST18, AZBL18], second-order excess loss [WL18], locally perturbed
adversarial inputs [SS17] among others.
Finally, our model can be cast as a rank-1 assumption on the structure of the reward function.
Rank-1 assumptions have been explored in various ways in the bandits literature, for example the
rank-1 bandit model [KKS+16] and factored bandits [ZS18] assume that the action space have a
cartesian product and hence the reward in each period can be represented as a matrix over which
the rank-1 assumption is made. In other words, this rank-1 structure is on the space of actions
unlike our model which is in the space of actions cross time. Another common setting where rank-1
assumptions ara made is in semi-parametric bandits [KWS18] where the loss function is a product
of unknown parameters and features. A difference with respect to our model is that the features
are observed by the learner while in our model the quality parameter qt is never observed by the
learner.
2 Model
We study a multi-armed bandit setting with k arms where each arm a ∈ [k] is associated with an
intrinsic mean parameter θ(a) ∈ [0, 1] which is unknown to the learner. We define F t(a) as the
distribution of the reward of arm a in round t and we assume that it has positive measure only on the
interval [0, 1]. The distributions are adaptively selected by the adversary subject to the constraint
that the means µt(a) = Er∼Ft(a)[r] must satisfy a rank-1 constraint, described below. Formally, the
protocol between the learner and the adversary at each round t = 1..T is as follows:
• The learner chooses a distribution pt over the k arms.
• The adversary chooses an adversarial quality parameter qt ∈ [0, 1] and distributions F t(a)
supported in [0, 1] with mean µt(a) = qt · θ(a).
• Rewards rt(a) ∼ F t(a) are drawn.
• Learner draws at ∼ pt and observes rt(at).
For ease of presentation, we assume that the highest intrinsic mean is equal to 1, i.e. maxa′ θ(a′) = 1.
This can be done by appropriately scaling down all the adversarial qualities replacing θ(a) by
θ(a)
maxa′ θ(a′)
and qt by qt ·maxa′ θ(a′).
Regret. The goal of the learner is to maximize the aggregate reward she accumulates. To evaluate
the performance of the learning algorithm, we compare this aggregate reward with the best strategy
of the learner if she had access to the reward distributions of each arm – in that case, the optimal
strategy is to select the arm with the highest intrinsic mean. The degradation that the algorithm
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incurs compared to this aware setting is captured by the notion of pseudo-regret in the purely
stochastic setting. Even though we have an adversarial component on the rewards, the optimal arm
to pull in each round is always an arm that maximizes θ(a) irrespectively of the scaling chosen by
the adversarial. This allows us to define pseudo-regret in the following way:
Reg = max
a∈[k]
E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(a?)− rt(at)
]
=
T∑
t=1
µt(a?)− µt(at) =
T∑
t=1
qt ·∆(at),
where ∆(a) = θ(a?) − θ(a) = 1 − θ(a). In other words, the pseudo-regret is worst-case over the
sequence q(t) but it is in expectation over the draws rt(a) ∼ F t(a).
3 Algorithms robust to adversarial scaling
In this section, we show that two algorithms, one that we introduce from the active arm elimination
family (Section 3.1) and one existing from the mirror descent family (Section 3.2) achieve the desired
robustness to adversarial scaling. A common property of both algorithms is their adaptivity on
the number of rounds; they do not scale with the number of rounds which is easily targeted by
adversarial scaling attacks. 1 In the next section, we show that other algorithms with improved
guarantees in the stochastic regime that do not enjoy such adaptivity have their performance severely
compromised at the presence of adversarial scaling.
3.1 Active Arm Elimination with Adversarial Scaling
The algorithm we introduce is based on Active Arm Elimination of Even-Dar, Mannor, and Mansour
[EMM06], but is appropriately adapted to handle the adversarial scaling of the rewards.
Classical Active Arm Elimination keeps a set of active arms (initially all arms) and selects arms
in a round-robin fashion among the active arms, updating the empirical mean of the selected arm
as well as a confidence interval around it. The latter ensures that when samples are i.i.d. (qt same
across rounds), with high probability, the actual mean lies within the confidence interval (this comes
from an application of a Chernoff bound). Once the confidence intervals cease overlapping, we are
confident that the dominated arm is not the arm with the highest intrinsic quality, thus it is safe to
eliminate it from the active arms and never select it again.
Trying to extend this approach to adversarial scaling, one encounters some difficulties. One issue is
that classic Active Arm Elimination selects arms deterministically. The adversary can easily cause
linear regret to any deterministic policy by setting qt = 0 anytime the algorithm is about to pull the
optimal arm. The natural way to get around this difficulty is to pull arms in the active set randomly.
A more serious issue is that the number of samples (arm pulls) is no longer a meaningful quantity.
The adversary may provide many samples initially with quality qt = 0. These samples do not help
in informing our estimates about where the intrinsic qualities {θ(a)} lie; therefore treating these as
real samples can provide a misleading picture of the confidence intervals. Ideally, we would like to
use as effective samples the total adversarial quality at rounds where we selected each arm a, i.e.∑
t:at=a q
t. Since we do not have access to this quantity, we need to design our confidence intervals
in a way that will be robust to this adversarial scaling.
1The need for such adaptivity was only known in adversarial settings prior to our work.
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The main idea behind robustifying our confidence intervals is to use the reward of our algorithm as a
proxy of the total effective samples of each arm. At the rounds that we selected arm a?, the reward
of the algorithm is, in expectation, equal to the effective samples of a? (since θ(a?) = 1). Since we
select each non-eliminated arm with equal probability, the total reward of the algorithm S serves
as proxy for the effective rounds of each arm (Sk is a lower bound and S is an upper bound). Our
algorithm, formalized in Algorithm 1, uses the proxy S instead of the unknown effective samples to
construct confidence intervals for the arms; in fact, there is a single confidence interval CB(S).
Algorithm 1 Active Arm Elimination with Adversarial Scaling (AAEAS)
Initialize the set of active arms A = [k], the aggregate reward for each arm R(a) = 0, and the
total reward collected by the algorithm S = 0.
for t=1. . . T do
Select at randomly across the set of active arms A and earn reward rt(at)
Update the total reward earned:
S ← S + rt(at)
Update empirical reward of selected action:
R(at)← R(at) + rt(at).
Eliminate arms based on algorithm-induced confidence intervals, i.e. remove all a′ from A if
R(a′) +CB(S) < max
a∈A
R(a)
for confidence bound (setting δ′ = (k+1)Tδ ):
CB(S) := 2
√
max
(
4S log(2/δ′), 16k log2(2/δ′)
)
end for
Theorem 3.1. The AAEAS algorithm (Algorithm 1) run with δ = 1T has pseudo-regret at most:
O
∑
a6=a?
k log
(
kT
)
∆(a)

The proof follows the standard active arm elimination analysis but replaces the samples of each arm
by the proxy-created confidence interval. For completeness, we provide the Chernoff bound which
we use in our analysis.
Lemma 3.2 (standard Chernoff bound). Let {Xi} be independent random variables in [0, 1], µ =
E[
∑
iXi],  > 0:
Pr
[∑
i
Xi − µ ≥ µ
] ≤ 2e−µ2/3
Proof of Theorem 3.1. To prove the guarantee, we need to ensure two properties: i) the arm a? with
highest intrinsic quality, with high probability, never gets eliminated and ii) we can bound the regret
incurred by each suboptimal arm.
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Our analysis is based on a few events occurring and we bound the failure probability of these events.
We separate the time horizon in phases where a phase φ begins when exactly φ arms have been
eliminated; denote by τφ the round that the φ-th arm gets eliminated. First, the empirical reward
R(a) that we experience for each arm is close to its expected reward R¯(a), that is, for each arm a
and each round t, with probability 1− δ′:
R(a) ∈
[
R¯(a)±
√
2R¯(a) log(2/δ′)
]
where R¯(a) =
k−1∑
φ=0
min(t,τφ+1)∑
τ=τφ+1
θ(a) · qτ
k − φ (1)
This follows by a Chernoff bound (Lemma 3.2), since the rewards at round t are supported in [0, 1]
and the arms are sampled uniformly at random from the set of active arms.
In a similar fashion, we can provide a similar confidence bound for the reward of our algorithm. For
any round t, with probability 1− δ′:
S ∈
[
S¯ ±
√
2S¯ log(2/δ′)
]
for S¯ =
∑
a
R¯(a) (2)
Setting all failure probabilities to δ′ = δ(k+1)T , the probability that any of them fails is at most δ. In
the remainder of the proof, we assume that none of these bounds fails.
First property. First, we establish that, when these bounds do not fail, the arm a? with the
highest intrinsic mean does not become eliminated. Since the mean for any arm a 6= a? is at most
the mean for a?, equation (1) implies:
R(a)−R(a?) ≤ 2
√
2R¯(a?) log(2/δ′)
We now show that, at every round, this difference is covered by the confidence bounds of our
algorithm, i.e:
CB(S) ≥ 2
√
2R¯(a?) · log(2/δ′) (3)
If R¯(a?) ≤ 8k log(2/δ′) then (3) holds as the second term of CB(S) is 2
√
16k log2(2/δ′) ≥
2
√
2R¯(a?) · log(2/δ′). Otherwise, (2) and the optimality of a? imply:
S ≥ S¯ −
√
2S¯ log(2/δ′) ≥ R¯(a?)−
√
2kR¯(a?) log(2/δ′) ≥ R¯(a
?)
2
since the function x 7→ x2 − 12
√
x · 8k log(2/δ′) is increasing for x ≥ 8k log(2/δ′).
Hence, (3) holds as the first term of CB(S) is 2
√
4S log(2/δ′) ≥ 2
√
2R¯(a?) · log(2/δ′). Since, in
both cases, (3) holds, arm a? does not become eliminated.
Second property. Now we bound the regret coming from each suboptimal arm. Let’s consider
the contribution to regret of arm a 6= a? with gap ∆(a). First we bound the difference of empirical
rewards of two arms. By (1) and the fact that θ(a?) = 1 we have that:
R(a?)−R(a) ∈
[
∆(a) · R¯(a?)± 2
√
2R¯(a?) log(1/δ′)
]
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We want to argue that once R¯(a?) is large enough, the difference between the two arms R(a?)−R(a) >
CB(S), which leads to arm a getting eliminated and not contributing further regret. Let T (a) denote
the time of the elimination of arm a. Since arm a is selected with equal probability with other active
arms until then, the total expected regret from a is at most:
∆(a) ·
k−1∑
φ=0
min(τφ+1,T (a))∑
τφ+1
qt
k − φ ≤ ∆(a) · S¯
T (a) (4)
where S¯T (a) denotes the value of S¯ at round T (a); recall that the latter is defined in (2). We will
argue that arm a is eliminated by the time we have:
S¯T (a) >
128k log(2/δ′)
∆(a)2
, (5)
In order for an arm to be eliminated the difference R(a?)−R(a) needs to be relatively large. This
difference can be expressed as:
R(a?)−R(a) ≥ R¯(a?)− R¯(a)− 2
√
2
(
R¯(a?)
)
log(2/δ′)
= ∆(a) · R¯(a?)− 2
√
2R¯(a?) log(2/δ′)
≥ ∆(a) · S¯
T (a)
k
− 2
√
2
S¯T (a)
k
log(2/δ′). (6)
The first inequality follows by applying (1) for both arm a and a?, and noting that R¯(a?) ≥ R¯(a).
The second inequality is since θ(a?)− θ(a) = ∆(a). For the third inequality, first note that:
R¯(a?) ≥ S¯
T (a)
k
, (7)
by the definitions of R¯(a?) and S¯T (a), and since θ(a?) = 1 and θ(a) ≤ 1 for all a 6= a?. Combining
(7) and (5), we therefore establish that R¯(a?) ≥ S¯T (a)k ≥ 2 log(2/δ
′)
∆(a)2
. The third inequality then follows
directly since the function x 7→ ∆(a)x− 2√2x log(2/δ′) is increasing for x ≥ 2 log(2/δ′)
∆(a)2
.
We can re-arrange the terms in equation (5) and obtain:
∆(a)
S¯T (a)
2k
≥ 2
√
2
S¯T (a)
k
log(2/δ′) (8)
Combining (6) and (8) with the fact that ∆(a) ≤ 1, it holds:
R(a?)−R(a) ≥ S¯
T (a)
2k
∆(a) ≥
√
32S¯T (a) log(2/δ′).
The latter term is greater than the second term of the confidence bound CB(S). Comparing to
the first, denoting ST (a) the value of S at T (a), it holds that ST (a) ≤ 2S¯T (a) by (2) and (5). Hence,
the latter RHS also dominates the first term of the confidence bound CB(S). As a result, if arm a
was not eliminated by then, it gets eliminated when the expected reward of the algorithm becomes
S¯T (a) = 128k log(2/δ
′)
∆(a)2
; by (4) this implies that the expected contribution of arm a to the regret is at
most 128k log(2/δ
′)
∆(a) . Summing across all suboptimal arms a 6= a? and setting δ = 1/T completes the
proof.
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Remark 3.3. While the proof is written in expectation over draws rt(at) ∼ F ta all arguments are
high-probability arguments. The bound therefore can be converted to a high probability regret bound
(as usual in stochastic bandits) with the difference that instead of capping the performance of each
arm by ∆(a)T as in the previous remark, we cap it by
√
T . Formally, we obtain that with probability
1− δ we obtain the following bound on actual regret:
O
(∑
a
min
(√
T ,
k · log(kT/δ)
∆(a)
))
3.2 Online Mirror Descent with Log-Barrier
The second algorithm that we show to be robust to adversarial scaling lies in the mirror descent
family and has a stronger regularizer, log-barrier. It was initially suggested by [FLL+16] for a fixed
learning rate η, who proved that it attains first-order bounds for pseudo-regret. The update on the
probabilities is the following (Algotithm 3 in [FLL+16] adapted to rewards):
pt(at−1) =
pt−1(at−1)
1− ηrt(at−1) + γpt−1(at−1)
pt(a) =
pt−1(a)
1 + γpt−1(a)
∀a 6= at−1 (9)
where γ ≥ 0 is such that p is a valid probability distribution.
Via using a neat doubling trick to update the learning rate η, Wei and Luo [WL18] showed that, in
fact, this algorithm can also attain stochastic guarantees (Algorithm 3 in [WL18] for the particular
doubling trick). In particular, the algorithm halves the learning rate and restarts once:
t∑
τ=tR
k∑
a=1
pτ (a)2
(
r̂τ (a)− rτ (at))2 ≥ k lnT
3η2
,
where tR is the time of the last restart and r̂τ (a) = rτ (a)/pτ (a) ·1[a = at] is the importance sampling
estimator. Their algorithm is a particular instantiation of a more general framework they termed
BROAD.
We show that the BROAD algorithm (with no modification) is robust to adversarial scaling. The
proof follows from replacing the potential the potential function in the proof of Theorem 10 in [WL18]
to a potential that accommodates adversarial scaling. The remaining arguments are essentially the
same as the ones used by [WL18] in their analysis of the stochastic setting.
Theorem 3.4. Online Mirror Descent with Log-Barrier with the above doubling (also known as
BROAD) has pseudo-regret at most O
(
k log T
∆
)
where ∆ is the minimum non-zero gap on intrinsic
means.
We will use the following results proved in [WL18]. The first lemma corresponds to equation (27) in
their paper and the second to equation (29). They are restated here for rewards instead of losses.
Lemma 3.5 ( [WL18]). There is a constant C such that for pt(a), rt(a) and rˆt(a) in the BROAD
algorithm it holds that:
E
[ T∑
t=1
rt(a?)− rt(a)
]
≤ Ck lnT + C ·
√√√√(k lnT )E[ T∑
t=1
k∑
a=1
(
pt(a)2
(
r̂t(a)− rt(at))2]
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Lemma 3.6 ([WL18]). Again in the context of BROAD, it holds that:
Eat∈pt
[ k∑
a=1
pt(a)2
(
r̂t(a)− rt(at))2] ≤ max
a
E[rt(a)] · 2E[1− pt(a?)]
Proof of Theorem 3.4. The pseudo-regret of the algorithm can be expressed as:
T∑
t=1
E
[
rt(a?)− rt(at)] = T∑
t=1
E
[ k∑
a=1
pt(a)
(
rt(a?)− rt(a))]
≥ E
[ T∑
t=1
∑
a6=a?
pt(a)qt∆
]
= ∆E
[ T∑
t=1
qt
(
1− pt(a?))] (10)
where the inequality holds by noting that the difference in the means is at least qt ·∆. Note that in
the adversarial scaling setting, we can bound the term maxaE[rt(a)] in Lemma 3.6 by qt obtaining:
Eat∈pt
[ k∑
a=1
pt(a)2
(
r̂t(a)− rt(at))2] ≤ 2qt ·E[1− pt(a?)] (11)
By Lemma 3.5 as well as (11) and (10), setting as potential function H = E
[∑T
t=1 q
t(1− pt(a?))
]
it
holds that:
H∆ ≤
√
(k lnT )H + k lnT
which leads to H ≤ K lnT
∆2
and concludes the proof.
Remark 3.7. Delving into Theorems 3.1 and 3.4, the reader may wonder whether the logarithmic
dependence on T is necessary or whether it can be replaced by logarithmic dependence on Q =
∑
t q
t
at least for pseudo-regret guarantees. For BROAD, this is indeed the case with a simple change in
the analysis: log(T )∆ only appears inside the analysis to bound the divergence term and can be replaced
by log(Q)∆ . For AAEAS, the logarithmic dependence on T appears in the confidence bound used by the
algorithm. By adapting this confidence bound, we can obtain regret at most log(1/p)∆ with probability
1− p leading to an expected regret of log(1/p)∆ + p ·Q. If we have access to a known upper bound on
Q, we can replace p = 1Q and obtain
log(Q)
∆ . At the absence of such an upper bound, it is not clear
how to set the confidence bound in a way that achieves this goal.
4 Attacks against other stochastic algorithms
Besides AAE and BROAD which we previously discussed, there are few other algorithms available
offering log T/∆ type of guarantees for stochastic bandits. In this sections we discuss how those
perform in adversarial scaling settings. We describe two adversarial scaling attacks: (a) small means;
and (b) cold-start. Besides AAEAS and BROAD we show that the remaining alternatives perform
poorly in either of those cases. The algorithms we consider are:
• Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) [ACBF02] keeps track of the total reward r(a) of each arm
and the number of times n(a) each arm was pulled. For each arm we compute the upper
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confidence bound of each arm as Ucb(a) = r(a)n(a) +
√
log t
n(a) and deterministically pull the arm
with largest Ucb. As we previously mentioned, every algorithm that deterministically selects
an arm can be easily fooled by adversarial scaling by setting qt = 0 when the algorithm is
about to pull the optimal arm. We will see it is also tricked by much simpler (i.e. less adaptive)
attacks.
• Thompson Sampling (TS) [AG17] is more easily described for the Bernoulli case where rewards
are in {0, 1}. The algorithm keeps a Beta(n0(a), n1(a)) prior for each arm a initially set with
n0(a) = n1(a) = 1. In each round, the algorithm takes a sample from each prior, chooses the
arm a with largest sampled value, observes the reward r ∈ {0, 1} and updates the prior by
increasing nr(a) by 1.
• EXP3++ [SS14]: While traditional EXP3 algorithms of [ACBFS95] don’t offer log T/∆
guarantees in stochastic settings, this modification does by introducing an exploration parameter
tuned for each arm as a function of its past comparative performance. Each arm is explored
with probability given by such parameter and with remaining probability a standard EXP3
algorithm is run. This algorithm retains the EXP3 guarantees in the adversarial regime.
• Tsallis Entropy [ZS19]: A recent breatkthrough result provides an optimal algorithm (up to
constants) for both stochastic and adversarial bandits via a standard mirror descent regularized
by the Tsallis entropy. Remarkably, this algorithm requires no special tuning and no deviation
from the standard mirror descent paradigm. The algorithm computes an unbiased estimator
r˜(a) of the reward of each arm and then samples an arm from the probability distribution in
the solution of the following maximization problem:
max
p∈∆
∑
a
r˜(a) · p(a) + 4√
t
[∑
a
√
p(a)− 1
2
p(a)
]
In Figure 1 we compare those algorithms in a purely stochastic instance with large means. As
usually noted in the literature, the performance of Thompson Sampling is vastly superior than all
other algorithms. On this instance, UCB, Tsallis and BROAD have similar perfomance, EXP3++ is
somewhat worse followed by AAE and AAEAS which are notably worse. This is expected as they
are the least adaptive. It is good to keep those in mind as we compare their performance on certain
adversarial scaling scenarios.
Figure 1: Comparison of different bandit algorithms for a purely stochastic instance (qt = 1, ∀t) with two arms with
means µ = [0.5, 0.8]. The cumulative in each round is the average of 100 runs of the each algorithm.
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4.1 Small means
Even in the absence of adversarial scaling the AAEAS and BROAD algorithm start outperforming
other algorithms as the means become smaller and smaller. Consider a purely stochastic instance
(i.e. qt = 1 for all t) with only two arms with means 1 ≥ θ1 > θ2 ≥ 0 and let ∆ = θ1 − θ2. The
traditional pseudo-regret bound obtained by stochastic bandits algorihtms is O(log(T )/∆). The
bound obtained by AAEAS and BROAD on the other hand is O(θ1 · log(T )/∆), which follows by
viewing this purely stochastic problem as an instance with adversarial scaling with qt = θ1 and two
arms with θ′1 = 1 and θ′2 =
θ2
θ1
. In Figure 2 we compare the same algorithms in an instance with
two Bernoulli arms having means 0.005 and 0.001. We see that while the performance of AAEAS
and BROAD is unaffected by scaling the means down, the performance of UCB, AAE, Tsallis and
EXP3++ degrades despite the fact that the relative strength of both arms remains almost the same.
Figure 2: A purely stochastic instance (qt = 1, ∀t) with two arms with small means µ = [0.005, 0.001]. The cumulative
in each round is the average of 100 runs of the each algorithm.
A direct consequence of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.4 is the following (we treat the number of arms
k as a constant in order to unify the statements for AAEAD and BROAD):
Corollary 4.1. Given a stochastic bandit instance where rewards are supported in [0, 1] with means
θ(a), then the performance of AAEAS and BROAD: O
(
maxa θa ·
∑
a
log(T )
∆(a)
)
.
Interestingly, the performance of Thompson Sampling seems unaffected by adversarial scaling. It is
not clear to us how to generalize the proof of [AG17] to explain the good performance of Thompson
Sampling in the small mean regimes. We leave understanding this phenomenon as an open problem.
4.2 Cold start attack
A very effective type of attack against randomized algorithms (even Thompson Sampling) is the
cold start attack, where for the first t0 periods, the adversary chooses qt = 0 giving the algorithm
the impression it has pulled a lot of arms although there are effectively no pulls. In Figure 3 we
exhibit an extreme form of this attack, where we have a very long cold-start period (t0 = 107) and
from then on we have a standard stochastic instance with means 0.5 and 0.8. The performance of
all algorithms except AAEAS and BROAD is severely hurt. In fact this performance degradation
can become arbitrarly bad as t0 →∞. This happens for different reasons depending on the type of
algorithm:
• For confidence-bound based algorithms like UCB and AAE, the cold start attack produces
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Figure 3: Comparison of different bandit algorithms on an extreme cold start instance: qt = 0 for t < t0 = 107 and
qt = 1 afterwards. Arm means are µ = [0.5, 0.8]. We only plot the rounds after t0 since the loss up to that point is
zero.
the impression that the arms have much smaller mean than they actually have. Since the
confidence bounds scale with the inverse square root of the empirical gap, the exploration
phase can be arbitrarly extended as t0 grows to infinity.
• Tsallis and EXP3++ are mirror-descent based algorithms that have a learning rate schedule
that depends directly on the number of rounds (ηt = 1/
√
t in either case). For those the
cold-start will cause the learning rate to start at 1/
√
t0 which is much smaller than the learning
rate that would be required for a stochastic instance with larger means. Note that while
BROAD is also based on mirror descent, the learning rate is adaptively tuned based on the
rewards and it not directly depending on the numbers of rounds. This ability of adaptive tuning
also enables first-order bounds for BROAD [FLL+16] and stems from the strong log-barrier
regularizer that effectively deals with the variance in the second-order term. In contrast, Tsallis
and EXP3++ have weaker regularizers and do not admit first-order bounds; for the same
reason, we believe that it is unlikely that their learning rate can be appropriately tuned to
circumvent this issue.
• Thompson Sampling is based on keeping a prior on the means of the arms. A large number of
cold-start periods leads the algorithm to a state with very skewed priors. Once we reach the
end of the cold-start period at t0 each arm will have a beta distribution around Beta(t0/k, 1)
instead of Beta(1, 1).
Figure 4: Comparing AAEAS with Thompson Sampling on a cold start instance (t0 = 25) with means µ = [0.5, 0.8].
The y-axis is the cummulative loss of the algorithm averaged over 100 runs.
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In Figure 4 we compare Thompson Sampling and AAEAS in an instance with a very small number of
cold start rounds (t0 = 25) and then run the algorithm for another T = 30000 rounds. Interestingly,
we see that, even when the cold start is really small, the effect of the attack is long-lasting, which
provides powerful evidence that the phenomenon described is, in fact, an actual concern when
deploying Thompson Sampling. We also note that this phenomenon does not even need to be caused
due to an adversarial source. It could well occur that the initial samples are less effective because,
e.g., initially the advertised product is not yet well established which leads customers to prefer
alternative options. In fact, recent work has suggested that, under competition, learning algorithms
generally suffer from such an effect due to the exploration they need to perform in the beginning;
see [MSW18] and [ALSW19] and for a relevant discussion.
4.3 Discussion on algorithms not run
Finally, we would like to mention that there are a few other algorithms with logarithmic stochastic
guarantees that we decided to not include. The original best of both worlds algorithm SAO [BS12]
and its follow-up SAPO [AC16] are rooted in AAE and switch to EXP3 if some test fails. Similarly,
multi-layer AAE [LMPL18] provides a way to robsutify AAE to adversarial corruptions. Since the
instances are mostly stochastic and therefore the tests are not expected to fail, their performance
is strictly inferior to the one of AAE. Another line of work focuses on stochastic algorithms from
the EXP3 family that can effectively select non-stationarities in the environment, e.g. the R.EXP3
algorithm [BGZ14]. These algorithms again come with horizon-dependent learning rates and are
expected to suffer similarly with Tsallis and EXP3++ (that belong to the same family). Finally, for
the same reason, we did not run the recent HYBRID algorithm [ZLW19] which extends upon Tsallis
but again uses horizon-dependent learning rates.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we suggest a new intermediary model between stochastic and adversarial bandits where
an adversary can rescale all rewards in a given round by the same factor. We show that two adaptive
algorithms are robust to this adversarial scaling and provide two natural attacks that demonstrate
that other stochastic algorithms are not.
There are two nice open questions coming from our work. AAEAS is weaker by a factor of k
compared to BROAD; we believe that our analysis is tight in that matter but it would be interesting
to see if some alternative modification of AAE can remove this dependence. Moreover, Thompson
Sampling, although ineffective for the cold start attack, has very good performance in the small
means attack; this suggests that its analysis could become more tight to scale with the ratio of the
means (rather than their difference).
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